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    Turkey: Zero Conflicts with Neighbors– except for those calling for it

    0 תגובות   יום שבת, 8/10/11, 22:44

    Turkey: Zero Conflicts with Neighbors– except for those calling for it

    Dr. David Peled

    Abstract

    Something is gone wrong with the Turkish international discourse. Peaceful and reconciliatory style is pushed aside by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan aggressive and belligerent declarations, sparing none of his adversaries. Not only, his favorite Israel, but Greece, Cyprus, and even Brussels found themselves on the line of fire. Has Ankara abandoned its Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu mantra "zero conflicts with neighbors" for the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's contested style? The article tries to evaluate whether the Turkish foreign policy is embarking on a new rout, or the present verbal eruptions are transient reactions to some outcomes of the "Arab Spring."

    Introduction

    On AKP (the Justice and Development Party) assuming power in 2002, Prime Minister Erdogan embraced his councilor (and then his foreign minister) Davutoglu three principles: - reshaping Turkish identity formed by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk; - increasing the weight of economic factors on the behalf of national security; - changing Turkey's image in the international arena. In less than nine years, meaningful and very impressive results followed. The relations with the Moslem World greatly improved. Economy is rated as the sixth economy on mondial scale, the US, and most of all – the EU, treat Turkey as an equal peer. The highway to geopolitical Turkish hegemony in the Middle East seems now wide open than ever.    

    All achievements were harvested through running initiatives both in the economy and in diplomacy. Ankara intervened in every neighbor's disputes,  or insolvable as they might be, as a mediating and understanding third party, while paving commercial routs for Turkish export. The Iranian nuclear crisis, the Israeli-Syrian stalemate, the Balkan Croatians-Serbians bitter after-war rupture, the Caucasus martial collisions, presented challenges for the highly motivated Turkish diplomacy. Old internal Kurdish unrest and the heavy loaded WWI Armenian genocide were approached with silky gloves, while looking for peaceful reachable solutions.

     Turkish economy flourished. GNP and the rate of trading with neighboring countries tripled itself; export in 2008 grew six folds since 2000; and FDI in 2007 became 22 times greater than in the beginning of the decade. The armed forces gave up their Mustafa Kemal Atatürk assignment as the super guardian of the secular democracy was called off by the reelected powerful Prime Minister in 2011, and all its General Staff was replaced by loyal generals to the elected administration.        

    The new independent stance of Ankara, shoving down the traditional EU membership preference, increased the value of its shares in the everlasting talks with Brussels, weakening the leverage the West had on Turkey.

    At that very point, when it seemed that success is imminent in the present foreign policy style. Turkey took a U-turn. The first sign popped up in January 2009, at Davos, when Erdogan embarked on a collision rout with its former strategic ally Israel, by offending publicly the Israeli President Simon Peres. In August, 2011 he staged the present act (for now) is expulsion of the Israeli ambassador and degrading the Israeli in Ankara to the level of Consulate. In the same month Ankara threatened militarily Greece and Cyprus and Israel, and in the same time, a full-scale military operation was launched against the Kurds in North Iraq, in retaliation to PKP guerrilla attack. It then followed an ultimatum presented to Assad requesting an immediate calling-off any military actions against the massive demonstrations in Syria at the price of cooling down the relations with Teheran.    

    Disregarding for a moment, the complexity embedded in every singular event, it is evident that the Turkish style turned into aggressive and blunt initiatives, lacking any of the former subtle approach by Ankara for evolving conflicts. The expressions used by Erdogan in his frequent orations against Israel compete with Ahmadinejad's pungency used against the USA.  

    Why the sudden change in Turkey's policy, or could it be expected? Will the new Davutoglu style prevail, or is the Prime Minister materialize accumulated strategic assets, and returning national security to top priorities list is only temporary in a transient period for the Turkish foreign affairs? If the last assumption is valid, what made him change a winning horse now?    

    Turkeys destined goal.  

    Davutoglu vision is based on the history of Turkey, on Othman tradition. According to his geostrategic perception, Turkey is a central country blessed by multiple identities and is located in the center of Eurasia. So merited Turkey is obliged to assure security and stability not only to itself and but as well to its neighbors. These goals may be achieved by active involvement in the shaping of the regional politics.  

    His philosophy was accepted by the nationalists aspiring for regional hegemony derived from their geopolitics conception. It is also supported by the elite, holding the belief that Turkey is assigned by destiny to lead the Moslem World[1]. This rout deviates from the traditional notion of strong affinity with the Western world, originated during the Cold War, and caused indifference to the conflicts in the Middle East.

    The anti-American orientation pervading the area, empowered by the invasion to Iraq, served as a perfect opportunity to apply Davutoglu political philosophy. While the Balkan was under the influence of EU, and the Caucasus was dominated by Russian diplomacy, the Middle East seemed to be a very promising starting point for Turkish intervention (opportunity identified also by Teheran). Davutoglu adopted mediation in conflicts as a useful tool for gaining leverage points in the regional diplomacy. It was an implicit declaration that Ankara is ready to assume the duty of a leading regional power by finding solutions for conflicts in its influence sphere. 

    Approaching Syria, while deepening the strategic cooperation with Israel, opened the way for mediation between the two enemies, at the point where Washington had failed. As a result, Syria, a proxy of Teheran, gained rehabilitation from Washington, was marked out from the terrorist-states list, and opened for Ankara a mediation rout on the highly contested Iranian nuclear project. Though nothing was achieved in the Israeli-Syrian front then move proved itself successful in promoting Turkey's interests in Teheran. Other conflicts delivered the expected goods.  

    Today Turkey is recognized as regional power, where the Balkan, the Caucasus and in the Black Sea, are included within the sphere of its influence. It exerts its soft and hard capabilities, and is considered no longer as the Western spearhead in the East[2]. The 74% majority of Turkish citizens supporting the association with the EU community turned into 30% today.  As the President Abdullah Gull put it lately: "The issues dealt by the international community today, situated Turkey an advantageous position."

    Degrading security factor

     Security used to be the prime factor in Turkey's policy until 2002. The AKP embraced the principal of "Trading State," first developed by Richard Rosecrance[3], and more recently, political scientist Kemal Kirisci applied this concept to Turkish foreign policy. As a security consumer, Turkey developed dependence on the West, which came with adopting the Western priorities.  This preference eroded during the last decade. The increasing importance of democratic values[4], the rise of geopolitical factors, and criticism on the independent role of the armed forces in the Turkish society contributed their share to drifting away towards "zero conflicts with neighbors" helped decision-makers to degrade the Western influence on the Turkish government.

    The first step was taken in 2005. The President Ahmet Necdet Sezer paid a visit to Damascus, against the advice of the State Department. One of the important results of the visit was the diminishing of the Syrian support given to the Kurdish underground – PKK.

    Ankara stopped considering the Iraqi instability a threat and views the situation as an opportunity for penetration. Initiating civil projects in the north of Iraq, like commerce, investments in great structural projects in energy and transportation development, signify the new Turkish approach. Until recently, mutual conferences with the Iraqi or the Syrian government seemed inconceivable, were taking place until the last demonstrations' eruption in Syria. The new wind in foreign affairs led to cancel the use of visa with Russia and with Syria, which signifies symbolically the degrading of State's security factor.  

    Turkey as a "Trading State"

     The priority of a "Trading State" is its commerce. Military capabilities come second. The rate of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and its commerce grow is at least equal to the Military power. This trend developed in Turkey since 1980 when Turkey abandoned the tariff barriers' protection and signed in 1996 free trade agreement with the EU[5]. The transformation into a liberal market economy expanded the trade successfully. Within a decade, the GDP was increased from 192 billion to 640 US$; export increased from 28 to 640 billion US$ putting Turkey's economy in the sixth place in the world. Turkey became very attractive to foreign investments and at the same period the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) increased from 800 million to 22 billion US$. One of the most impressive facts was the increase of the trade with Turkey's neighbors from 18 to 53 billion US$.  

    The Anatolia region is a unique phenomenon that supplied the backbone of the ruling party the AKP. It is a small and mid-sized industrial region comprised of dynamic and energetic entrepreneurs, which entitled them as "the Anatolian Tigers." Their produce unsophisticated merchandise which cannot compete in the European markets, but are suit the demand of Turkey's eastern and southern neighborhoods. The foreign policy opened for markets in Syria, Iraq, and in Africa. When referring to create "order" in the When referring to create "order" in the Middle East Davutoglu book "Strategic Depth" stresses that this order cannot be achieved as an  isolated economy; [6]e.g. economic independence should help in resolving conflicts and in shaping regional peace, and with the same token expand the Turkish trade to new markets.    

    On 7.2.11 Ankara and Teheran signed a mutual trade agreement according to which within five years the trade between the two countries will increase to 30 billion US$[7].

    Collecting diplomatic assets as peace brokers

    Diplomacy through mediation in almost hopeless conflicts proved itself a very successful tool in changing the image of Ankara in the international community. The intervention did not always resolve the conflicts but showed very advantageous in expanding Turkey's outlets to neighboring markets. In Lebanon, with Ankara help, the deadlock was open and the rival factions succeeded in forming government. Mediation efforts were launched all over its neighborhood: Syria, the Balkan (Serbia versus Bosnia-Herzegovina), the Caucasus (Georgia, Abkhazia). Some vital bleeding conflicts with Armenia, Cyprus, and the Kurds remained unsolved.  

    In Syria, the Foreign Office bridged the gap between the terrorist country and the West, failed to solve the insolvable conflict with Israel; but it opened the Syrian market for the "Anatolian Tigers," and carved a path through Damascus to Teheran. Davutoglu isolated the Kurds problem, a view that helped him to discover opportunities in Iraq's economy. As a result, he succeeded in persuading the Sunnis to support the "forces accord," leading to form a government in Iraq and make it easier the evacuation of for the US troops from Iraq.  

    Turkey developed initiatives in the Balkan. The changes taking place in Serbia, the urge of the President Boris Tadic to join the EU community and the deep mistrust history between Belgrade and Sarajevo, opened a crack for Turkish intervention. Ankara developed a three party's talks-mechanism between the presidents of Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Turkey. Ankara believed that a Serbian parliament's resolution asking for amnesty on war crimes executed in Srebrenica might support the move of mutual diplomatic consulate exchange between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The gamble proved itself.

    Ankara was elected as a member of the UN Security Council (2009-2010) after 47 years of absence. It participates in numerous international comities dealing with cultural or political conflicts. It opened roots to Africa by founding supporting funds; and most important what Ankara finds vital to its destiny: winning an appreciated membership in the Moslem States Organization.

    Analysis

    The world crisis influence differently leaders' decisions. The Libyan civil war exposed NATO impotence. Without the Washington the European could hardly allocate the necessary resources for a very limited war. The EU is totally preoccupied with existential problems exposed by the collapse of Greece, while Italy and Spain are on the line. The US faces a colossal debt led by a President fighting almost helplessly for his next term. The so called "The Arab Spring", turned out to a continued anarchy, led by the "Street", and now threatening the traditional regimes in the Moslem world. This scenery seems very advantageous to the radicals acting in the Middle East, especially for Iran.

    Three States are participating in the race for hegemony in the region: Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey. Riyadh gathers all its resources for defense against the "Arab Street." In its efforts, it invaded Bahrain and called Jordan and Morocco to join the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)[8], the last strength hold of the autocratic rulers. Teheran is defending its advanced post in Syria. Ankara is launching a diplomatic offensive; and in some issue, is very near to play on brinkmanship.

    Israel – a failure or materializing as strategic assets?  

    The collapse of the talks between Israel and Syria (2007-December 2008) was the watershed of the Turkish policy in the Middle East. In December 2008 Israel, after suffering daily shelled by rockets and mortar shells on its towns and civil settlement launched a major offensive on the Hamas in the Gaza strip. The broker Erdogan was taken by surprise and retaliated by insulting publicly the Israeli President, Shimon Peres in a Davos international convention. His rage added to recalculating Turkey's position in the Israeli-Arab conflict, and he reckoned that the choosing the Arabs side might turn to be more profitable and he embarked on a collision rout with Jerusalem. On 2 September 2011, Turkey downgraded diplomatic ties with Israel to second secretary level and suspended military co-operation between the countries as the UN released its report justifying the Israeli blockade but condemning as "Not proportional" the controversial raid of the Turkish ship.  

    Mr. Erdogan summed up the present Ankara's attitude towards Jerusalem in his speech before the UN general assembly on September 22 relating to the Palestinian Issue. He described the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a “bleeding wound” that the international community can no longer accept, accused Israel of thwarting all attempts to solve the problem. From nuclear weapons to control of the occupied territories to humanitarian aid, Mr. Erdogan said, Israel has contradicted the wishes and norms of the rest of the world. His last declaration, in which he doubts the legitimacy of the Israeli policy in the region, serves as a background to his threats to use his naval force in order to force the way for a future flotilla to Gaza.  

    The eruption of the "Arab Spring," the ambiguous attitude of Obama, and the public and echoing disagreements between Barak Obama and Benjamin Netanyahu enfeebled the deterrence potential of both USA and Israel in the Middle East. On the other hand, Erdogan became an honorable and influential personality in the Arab Street and in the Moslem institutions. It was the only natural move to solidify his gains in the fluid and fragile situation developed all over the region. The Palestinian issue was waiting for him to ride on it to new summits. For Erdogan, it was a win-win situation; he kept the profitable trade with Israel, and at the same time did not hesitate to deteriorate in the diplomatic relations. After the expulsion of the Israeli ambassador from Turkey, and the vicious attack of the Egyptian mob on the Israeli embassy in Cairo, he went on a tour as a hero in Egypt and in the Maghreb.  

    Ahmadinejad did not like this last move. This time Erdogan stepped on his toes in their mutual tango towards hegemony in the region. Until now, the "Arab Street" was his arena, and the USA and Israel were used as his red cloth before the bull's eyes. He used it very efficiently when striving with the Saudis, while King Abdullah's hands were tied by his special relations with Washington. Now he found his equal. The worship for Erdogan crosses the lines between the moderate and the radicals in the Moslem world.  

    Tuning with the new spirit of the "Arab Spring" Erdogan took an active stance against the oppression of the massive demonstrations by the Syrian army. He built refugee's camps at the Syrian border and menaced Assad to stop the Keeling. He paid for his independence in Iranian cash. Iran accused Turkey of collaborating with Western efforts to overthrow the Syrian regime. Religious leader Grand Ayatollah Naser Makarem-Shirazi censured Turkey, saying: “[Iran] did not expect Turkey to approve of arrogant powers and be at their complete disposal and to harm crisis-stricken Syria.” [9] The former Chairman of the Supreme Council, Ayatollah Hashemi Shahroudi, blamed Turkey for exploiting regional developments to further its own interests by promoting “liberal Islam”[10] - a term previously applied in Iran to describe Egypt and Saudi Arabia. However, the accusations could not derail to the bitter ideological controversy Teheran has with the Royal Riyadh.    

    Both adversaries know that trade, and diplomatic tension should not mix together. Still Teheran can always use the Kurds to express its inconvenience.  

    The Kurds

    Erdogan was the first Turkish leader to admit the insolubility of the Kurdish problem by sheer force, and turned to political solutions through compromising reforms in the Kurds status; yet officials close to the prime minister say he is fed up with the Kurds’ unrelenting demands. The reforms included calling off the prohibition on using the Kurdish mother-language, great investments in the underdeveloped Kurdish villages. The jewel in the crown was the participation of a Kurdish party on June 2011 election, gaining 35 seats in the Parliament. More than fifty secret meetings were held with the imprisoned influential Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan, and full armistice seemed to be at attainable. Ankara agreed that once the armed resistance is over, a full amnesty will be given to every active member of the PKK consenting to give up violence. Kurdish TV channel, presenting Kurdish positions at home and abroad, a federal status for the Kurds in the South-East of the country, and improvement in Öcalan's imprisonment conditions were discussed and agreed upon. However, at the same time hundreds of nationalists were arrested, including MPs[11].

    The gap between the PKK aspiration and those Erdogan was ready to give through the reforms are not bridgeable. Arab spring should be a great lesson to AKP as well along with autocratic rulers in the region. Democratic Turkey should also cover Kurds’ needs. One can easily see the frailty in the infrastructure, and unemployment is ubiquitous in the Kurdish regions. They can’t speak their language, and Kurdish is forbidden in the official places, including schools.  

    On August 17 2011 the PKK guerrilla ambushed a military convoy near the Iraq border and killed 15 Turkish soldiers. The retaliation was fast. On the next day, the Turkish army opened a three-day  offensive, attacking 60 Kurdish targeted villages in north Iraq, using its air force and heavy artillery, causing 100 and many casualties[12]. The Turkish Intelligence Service claims that the ambush was ordered by Fehman Hussein; a Syrian commander in the PKK, Murat Karayilan and a moderate pro-reforms PKK leader was abducted by Teheran[13].

    The discourse with Iran seems to reach the stage of containment of disagreements, as well as presenting stealth daggers while demarcating the contest lines by proxies. Turkey sends its messages through Syria, posing ultimatum to Assad and confiscating Iranian arm's shipment to Syria and to the Hezbollah[14], while Teheran hints at its annoyance by the supporting the PKK.      

    Turkey and Europe

    The independent line of Ankara is not overlooked by Europe. The Europeans expressed their annoyance through the Hurriyet Daily News "… its frustration with the EU should not blind Ankara to the importance of remaining part of the international consensus."  

    Ankara prolonged crisis with Greece and with Cyprus took a dangerous turn when Erdogan stepped towards threats of using his army to defend Turkish interests in the East of the Mediterranean Sea. This time he addressed not only Israel, but also Greece and Cyprus. Economic interests – the undersea bed gas, which could be easily solved under the "zero conflicts with the neighbors"" philosophy, became for Ankara a casus-belli. Mr. Erdogan told a news conference that "Currently, we also took this step with Northern Cyprus. And in very short time, possibly this week, it may happen. We start to work this exclusive region." He also said that Turkish military would monitor Greek-Cyprus activity in the area using aircraft, a frigate and torpedo boat[15]. This declaration followed a communiqué issued at a press conference by Deputy Prime Minister Besir Atalay two days before saying: "EU-candidate Turkey will freeze relations with European Union if Cyprus is given the EU presidency in 2012; It was quoted as saying by a state-run news agencies Anatolian on Saturday."  

    Ankara is actually striding on the brink.

    Conclusions

    The strife for the hegemony in the Arab World is led by three actors: Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. The arena is almost chaotic as a consequence of the Arab Spring. The Western powers are preoccupied with the internal economic crisis, and the USA has stretched its military capacities in the entanglement in Iraq, Afghanistan, and is complicated with terror originated in Pakistan during a presidential election race.

    Two of the candidates are menaced and have to allocate a great part of their resources for defending themselves; Iran, running its first priority goal, the nuclear project, against the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council, while Saudi Arabia is trying to gather the autocratic Arab regimes against the imminent flood of the Arab Spring. This leaves Turkey quite good chances to promote its goal.

    Turkey used successfully its Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu mantra "zero conflicts with neighbors" to strengthen its position in the international community and especially among the Moslems of the Middle East, while building strong economy. At present, its Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan feels that he has gathered enough economic and strategic assets, which can be validated in launching the second phase of his plan – acknowledgment by the World as a leading regional power. The end seems to justify any available mean, and the most efficient one is harnessing the Israel-Palestinian conflict to his chariot. Siding with the radical Arabs against his former ally while promoting the Palestinian Cause, promise the fuel for his struggle for the time being, and for years to come.

    The European Community rejected his efforts to join Europe. He hopes that in the next round of talks he might dictate his own terms, backed up by "his" region. It seems that Turkey is planning to make the most of the present Western crisis and of the fluid governments of his neighbors in his run for hegemony in the Middle East.          

     

     

    References

     

    Ahmet Davutoglu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007,” Insight Turkey, vol. 10, no 1, 2008.

    Arab News, 11.9.2011, http://www.arabnews.com/saudiarabia/article500539.ece

    CNN on Iran uranium, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-05-17/world/iran.nuclear_1_low-enriched-uranium-highly-enriched-turkish-foreign-ministry?_s=PM:WORLD

    Crisi group, Turkey and Greece: Time to Settle the Aegean Dispute, 19 Jul 2011, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/B64-turkey-and-greece-time-to-settle-the-aegean-dispute.aspx

    Economist, DIYARBAKIR AND ULUDERE, Giving war a chance, Aug 27th 2011  http://www.economist.com/node/21526936

    Frontline, Teheran Bureau, 05 Aug 2011, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/08/report-turkey-seizes-iran-arms-convoy-guard-general-to-

    Haaretz, 7.2.11  http://www.haaretz.com/news/international/turkey-and-iran-to-triple-bilateral-trade-despite-nuclear-sanctions-1.341822

    Heinz Kramer, “AKP’s New Foreign Policy Between Vision and Pragmatism,” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Working Paper, FG2, June 2010, http:// www.swp-

    Michael Segall, Deteriorating Relations between Iran and Turkey, September 21, 2011, http://jerusalemcenter.wordpress.com/2011/09/21/deteriorating-relations-

    New York Times, 18/8/11, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/19/world/europe/19turkey.html?_r=1

    New York Times, Mark Landler, At the UN, Turkey Asserts Itself in Prominent Ways, September 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/world/ europe/23diplo.html?scp=1&sq=turkey%20asserts%20prominent&st=cse

    Razmig Shirinian, Arab Spring and the Turkish model, 14 August 2011, http://www.opendemocracy.net/razmig-shirinian/arab-spring-and-turkish-model

    Reuters, Turkey strikes Kurd rebels in Iraq for third night, ANKARA | Sat Aug 20, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/20/us-turkey-iraq-idUSTRE77J0HC20110820

    Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1986).

    Scotsman, September 20 2011, http://www.scotsman.com/world/Cyprus-and-Turkey-clash-over.6839218.jp.

    SEBNEM ARSU "Turkey Attacks Kurdish Targets in Northern Iraq After Ambush… Turkish warplanes attacked 60 targets in the mountains and border areas of northern Iraq "New York Times 18.8.2011

    Sinan Ulgen, A Place in the Sun or Fifteen Minutes of Fame? Understanding Turkey's New Foreign Policy, Carnegie Europe, December 2010,

    Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1986).

    Segal Michael, Lt. Col. (ret.) Michael Segall, Deteriorating Relations between Iran and Turkey, September 21, 2011,  http://jerusalemcenter.wordpress.com/2011/09/21/deteriorating-relations-between-iran-and-turkey/

    Today Zaman, Iran denies it threatened Turkey, slams Western media, 29 June 2011, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-248869-iran-denies-it-threatened-turkey-slams-western-media.html

     

    [1] Sinan Ulgen, A Place in the Sun or Fifteen Minutes of Fame? Understanding Turkey's New Foreign Policy, Carnegie Europe, December 2010, http://carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=42141

    [2]  Heinz Kramer, “AKP’s New Foreign Policy Between Vision and Pragmatism,” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Working Paper, FG2, June 2010,

    http:// www.swp-berlin.org/en/common/get_document.php?asset_id=7270.

    [3] Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1986).

    [4] The application of democracy principals in Turkey is quite contested by Western observers. There is no free press and reporters are persecuted and thrown to jail whenever they criticize the government. Hundreds of Armenian and Greek churches, as well as Jewish synagogues are permanently locked up if not destroyed, only to indicate the sullen fact that minorities are under perpetual siege. Razmig Shirinian, Arab Spring and the Turkish model, 14 August 2011, http://www.opendemocracy.net/razmig-shirinian/arab-spring-and-turkish-model 

     

    [5]  Turkey has concluded free trade agreements with the following group of countries: the EFTA states, Israel, Serbia, Montenegro, Israel, Macedonia, Croatia, Bosnia, Morocco, Tunisia, Palestine, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Georgia, Albania, and Chile.

    [6] Ibid, quoting Ahmet Davutoglu, “Stratejik derinlik, Türkiye’nin Uluslararasi Konumu [Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position] (Istanbul: Küre yayinlari, 2001).

    [7] "Haaretz", 7.2.11  http://www.haaretz.com/news/international/turkey-and-iran-to-triple-bilateral-trade-despite-nuclear-sanctions-1.341822

    [8]  Arab News, 11.9.2011. http://www.arabnews.com/saudiarabia/article500539.ece

    [9] Lt. Col. (ret.) Michael Segall, Deteriorating Relations between Iran and Turkey, September 21, 2011, http://jerusalemcenter.wordpress.com/2011/09/21/deteriorating-relations-between-iran-and-turkey/ 

    [10]  Ibid.

    [11] Economist, DIYARBAKIR AND ULUDERE, Giving war a chance, Aug 27th 2011  http://www.economist.com/node/21526936

    [12]  Reuters, Turkey strikes Kurd rebels in Iraq for third night, ANKARA | Sat Aug 20, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/20/us-turkey-iraq-idUSTRE77J0HC20110820 

    [13]  Economist, DIYARBAKIR AND ULUDERE, The Turkish response to a surge in Kurdish violence has been swift and hard, The Economist, Aug 27th 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21526936

    [14]  Frontline, Teheran Bureau, 05 Aug 2011, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/08/report-turkey-seizes-iran-arms-convoy-guard-general-to-head-opec.html

    [15]  Scotsman, September 20 2011.

    http://www.scotsman.com/world/Cyprus-and-Turkey-clash-over.6839218.jp

     

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      דוד פלד, David Peled
      1. שלח הודעה
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